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Over the last 20 years, the topics of action observation (AO) and motor imagery (MI) have
been largely studied in isolation from each other, despite the early integrative account
by Jeannerod (1994, 2001). Recent neuroimaging studies demonstrate enhanced cortical
activity when AO and MI are performed concurrently (“AO+MI”), compared to either AO
or MI performed in isolation. These results indicate the potentially beneficial effects of
AO+MI, and they also demonstrate that the underlying neurocognitive processes are
partly shared. We separately review the evidence for MI and AO as forms of motor
simulation, and present two quantitative literature analyses that indeed indicate rather little
overlap between the two bodies of research. We then propose a spectrum of concurrent
AO+MI states, from congruent AO+MI where the contents of AO and MI widely overlap,
over coordinative AO+MI, where observed and imagined action are different but can
be coordinated with each other, to cases of conflicting AO+MI. We believe that an
integrative account of AO and MI is theoretically attractive, that it should generate novel
experimental approaches, and that it can also stimulate a wide range of applications in
sport, occupational therapy, and neurorehabilitation.
Keywords: motor simulation, mirror neurons, joint action, observational practice, mental practice, video therapy,
occupational therapy, motor rehabilitation
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we contribute to the emerging integration of
research on action observation (AO) and motor imagery (MI).
We outline a coherent account of both forms of action represen-
tation, which have been typically studied in their own right and
by different scientific communities and sub-communities (Moran
et al., 2012). Our first point is not new: observers can engage in
AO and MI simultaneously (“AO+MI”), and doing so does not
take particular skill. Such integrated AO+MI appears to be more
pervasive than either form of action representation alone. Our
second and main point is that the contents of such simultaneous
AO+MI need not coincide. We propose that there is a spectrum
from fully congruent AO+MI, where the observer imagines per-
forming the observed action, perhaps through periods of partial
occlusion from sight and enriched by the imagined kinesthetic
sensations that would arise during one’s own motor execution,
through to scenarios where the contents of AO and MI con-
flict, that is, where co-representation of two different actions is
difficult or impossible to sustain and where markers of represen-
tational depth indicate competition. Lying between the extremes
of congruent AO+MI and incongruent, conflicting contents of
AO and MI is the co-representation of two different actions that
can be coordinated in some manner. For example, in combat
sports, I might watch a video recording of a future opponent
whilst simultaneously imagining myself performing specific tech-
nical attacks or defense movements against that opponent. We
believe that this proposed spectrum from congruent over coor-
dinative to conflicting AO+MI states will motivate researchers to
probe the two component processes, as well as their interaction,
in greater depth than previously undertaken. At the same time,
we can see tremendous opportunities for examining the applica-
tion of various forms of concurrent AO+MI in motor learning
and neurorehabilitation.
Our article is organized as follows: In the first section, we turn
to the field of motor rehabilitation, where a number of research
groups have already made a research-based case for combin-
ing AO and MI. Both forms of action representation have been
proposed as promising adjunct treatments to conventional phys-
iotherapy, but an integrated approach to treatment is still largely
absent. We review recent neuroimaging studies which underpin
the proposal of integrating AO and MI in motor rehabilitation
and briefly point to future opportunities and open questions. In
section “Action observation and motor imagery—a continuum,”
we outline an integrative account of AO and MI as motor simu-
lation, inspired by the early contribution by Shepard (1984). In
section “Motor imagery as motor simulation,” we review the evi-
dence, from both behavioral and neuroimaging studies, for MI as
a prototypical form of action simulation, as originally proposed
by Jeannerod (2001, 2006). In section “Research on action obser-
vation and motor imagery,” we turn to research on AO, which
has generated comparable evidence for motor simulation during
AO. We then present evidence from two quantitative literature
analyses for the rather scarce overlap between research on MI
and on AO, and we discuss the links that have previously been
made between the two forms of action representation. In sec-
tion “Multiple roles of motor imagery during action observation,”
we then describe the full spectrum of AO+MI states as outlined
above, along with possible training applications. On a theoretical
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 807 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Vogt et al. Motor imagery during action observation
level, we propose a distinction between a default mode of action
simulation during AO and a more specific AO+MI state where
the observer actively maps the observed action onto her/his own
body schema via engaging in MI.
A CASE FOR MOTOR IMAGERY DURING ACTION
OBSERVATION
In motor rehabilitation, both MI and AO have been proposed as
adjunct treatments to conventional physiotherapy (e.g., Mulder,
2007; Garrison et al., 2010). The available clinical studies demon-
strate varied success of both MI (e.g., Crosbie et al., 2004;
Dijkerman et al., 2004; Page et al., 2007; Ietswaart et al., 2011;
for review see Braun et al., 2013; Malouin et al., 2013, this issue)
and AO therapy (Ertelt et al., 2007; Celnik et al., 2008; Ewan et al.,
2010; Franceschini et al., 2010; Cowles et al., 2013; for review see
Gatti et al., 2013), and a multi-center study on AO therapy is
currently underway (Ertelt et al., 2012). Typically only one form
of treatment, either MI or AO, has been used as an interven-
tion [for an exception, see Ietswaart et al. (2011)], possibly with
the conclusiveness of the clinical trial in mind. However, such a
“purist” approach ignores the possible benefits of a multimodal
motor simulation training with AO and MI as integrated com-
ponents. For example, in some of our electrophysiological and
neuroimaging studies, we have deliberately combined instruc-
tions for AO and MI in the practice phases (e.g., Wehner et al.,
1984; Higuchi et al., 2012), with the aim of maximizing the ben-
efits of non-physical forms of practice, even though doing so
precluded specific conclusions about the effects of pure AO vs.
pure MI vs. combined AO+MI.
Fortunately, a number of recent neuroimaging studies have
directly contrasted these conditions using healthy participants.
Filimon et al. (2007) compared activations during AO,MI (visuo-
motor imagery without visual input), and during execution of
reaching movements, and they found differences between AO and
MI only in occipital (visual motion) regions. Furthermore, motor
execution induced stronger activations than either AO or MI in
a number of execution-related areas, including primary sensori-
motor areas, posterior parietal cortex, and dorsal premotor cortex
[see also Vogt et al. (2007), for similar results during observa-
tion, preparation, and motor execution of a complex grasping
task]. In no less than four recent neuroimaging studies, passive
observation was contrasted with combined AO+MI, where the
instructions required participants to imagine performing the dis-
played movement from a first-person perspective (Macuga and
Frey, 2012; Nedelko et al., 2012; Berends et al., 2013; Villiger
et al., 2013). Nedelko et al. (2012) designed their conditions
to match their video therapy sessions with stroke patients and
included videos of simple and multiphasic hand-object interac-
tions, as well as pantomimed actions. Combined AO+MI induced
stronger activations than passive AO in inferior parietal cortex,
supplementary motor area (SMA), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG),
caudate nucleus, and the cerebellum. Macuga and Frey (2012)
contrasted passive AO, AO+MI, and AO plus imitative execution
of bimanual finger sequences. In line with the results of Filimon
et al. (2007), imitative execution induced stronger activations in
a number of execution-related areas. More importantly, com-
pared to passive AO, combined AO+MI increased activations in
the pre-SMA and left IFG, as well as cingulate cortex and ante-
rior insula. Further, a manipulation of visual perspective of the
observed action (1st- vs. 3rd-person) only produced differences
in occipital regions, which the authors attributed to differen-
tial stimulation of the lower and upper visual fields in their
paradigm. In the fMRI study by Villiger et al. (2013), essentially
the same three conditions as in Macuga and Frey (2012) were
compared for first-person displays of a kicking action. MI dur-
ing AO resulted in enhanced activations relative to AO alone in
bilateral ventral premotor cortex, left inferior parietal cortex, and
left insula. Further, a conjunction analysis of AO+MI and AO
plus imitative execution showed a substantial overlap between the
related activations in motor cortical areas, indicating that large
parts of the motor execution network can be activated during
AO+MI. Finally, Berends et al. (2013) demonstrated that the dif-
ferences between combined AO+MI and AO alone can also be
demonstrated using EEG. The authors found substantially larger
desynchronizations during AO+MI, where participants observed
movie clips of repeated pincer grips.
These studies highlight two important points. First, they
strengthen the evidence for a considerable overlap between AO,
AO+MI, and visually guided motor execution, in that all three
forms of action representation involve a bilateral network within
posterior parietal and frontal premotor cortex, also known as the
“AO network” [see also meta-analysis by Caspers et al. (2010),
and section “Research on action observation and motor imagery”
below]. Second, AO+MI induced stronger activations in certain
regions of this network than observation alone. On this basis, all
four research teams recommended the use of combined AO+MI
procedures in neurorehabilitation.
It should be noted, however, that stronger activations are not
always “better,” and that differential activations whilst engaging in
action representation instructions do not allow direct inferences
about the possible effects on skill learning. The study by Higuchi
et al. (2012) illustrates this point: Participants were scanned dur-
ing observational practice (involving combined AO+MI) and, in
separate scanning sessions, during imitative execution of man-
ual actions (guitar chords) that had previously been practiced
either via AO combined with MI, or via physical practice. As
expected, when scanned during AO, a common network involv-
ing posterior parietal and premotor regions was found acti-
vated, with only minor differences between the two forms of
practice (see also Cross et al., 2009). During imitative execu-
tion, the results were strikingly different: Chords that had been
observationally practiced induced substantially stronger activa-
tions during imitative execution than the physically practiced
chords. Given that the behavioral data indicated smaller prac-
tice effects for the observationally practiced actions than for the
physically practiced actions, and given the general trend for the
cortical activations to reduce with increasing practice (“neural
efficiency,” Kelly and Garavan, 2005; Babiloni et al., 2009, 2010),
these results indicated a lack of execution-related resources in
observationally practiced actions. Importantly, however, when
compared with non-practiced actions the observationally prac-
ticed actions also exhibited neural efficiency effects. Thus, whilst
the study by Higuchi et al. (2012) reminds us that we cannot
normally expect non-physical forms of practice to produce the
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same results as physical practice, it also indicates that AO+MI
procedures can have substantial benefits. In future, it would be
desirable that imaging studies contrast the practice effects of dif-
ferent forms of action representation, such as pure AO, pure MI,
and AO+MI.
Taken together, the studies reviewed in this section not only
illustrate the feasibility of simultaneous AO+MI instructions,
they also demonstrate the immediate facilitatory effects of com-
bining AO with MI, as well as longer-term positive effects on
motor learning (sensu neural efficiency). Whilst further clinical
trials are needed to confirm these effects in neurorehabilitation
(Ertelt et al., 2012), the above studies clearly indicate that AO and
MI training should not be seen as mutually exclusive means of
treatment, but that their combined and simultaneous usage can
be highly recommended. This conclusion will hopefully empower
physiotherapists to develop and apply a wide range of tasks to help
patients to (re-)engage inmotor simulation processes. Many open
questions remain at present, such as the suitability of specific sub-
forms of motor simulation training for particular patient groups,
the most suitable design of video therapy materials, and which
perspective andmodality instructions might bemost appropriate.
ACTION OBSERVATION AND MOTOR IMAGERY—A
CONTINUUM
Roger Shepard once caricatured “perception as externally guided
hallucination, and dreaming and hallucination as internally simu-
lated perception” (Shepard, 1984, p. 436). Similarly, we see AO as
externally guided motor simulation, and MI as internally simu-
lated execution. The idea that motor simulation might underlie
both AO and MI was originally proposed by Jeannerod (1994,
2001, 2006), andmore recently motor simulation, along with pre-
diction as its most prominent cognitive function, has become
a commonly accepted framework for a wide range of cognitive
domains (Grush, 2004; Kilner et al., 2007; Bubic et al., 2010;
Pezzulo et al., 2013). Before we turn to motor simulation in AO
and MI in greater detail, we wish to illustrate the possible rela-
tionships between them by means of Figure 1, which is adapted
from Shepard (1984) but reframed for the present purposes. Both
schemata aim to distinguish different “externally and internally
instigated representational processes” (ibid., p. 435).
ACTION OBSERVATION
With reference to Figure 1, the most frequently studied case
of AO is (b), which represents observation of another person’s
action under favorable viewing conditions. The schema firstly
suggests that this proceeds (rapidly) from sensory processing of
the observed action to motor simulation processes (e.g., Eskenazi
et al., 2009; Zentgraf et al., 2011; for discussion, see Kilner, 2011).
Second, the orientation of the triangles indicates the externally
driven character of sensory and motor processes in this case. This
implies that motor simulation processes are not only initiated by
sensory events but that they can also unfold in close coupling to
external, temporally extended events such as observed actions.
Rectangle (a) in Figure 1 indicates that motor simulation pro-
cesses are not mandatory in AO. For instance, in the domain of
speech perception, Scott et al. (2009) concluded that motor sim-
ulation processes are more heavily involved under impoverished
Motor 
simulation
.
.
.
.
.
Sensory 
resonance
Temporal structure internally generated
Temporal structure externally provided
a b c d e f
FIGURE 1 | The continuum between action observation and motor
imagery, modified from Shepard (1984), for details see text. Note:
Whereas Shepard’s scheme encompassed a wider range of cognitive
processes, we focus on AO and MI. In addition, we have replaced
Shepard’s ordinate of a “hierarchy of resonant modes” (from most concrete
and sensory at the bottom to most abstract and conceptual at the top) by a
sensory-motor axis.
stimulation (e.g., distorted speech) so that (a) would represent
the normal case in this domain. Whereas motor involvement in
AO is a more typical finding than in speech perception, the latter
at least illustrates the possibility of AO without the involvement
of simulation processes. For instance, drawing on the study by
Buccino et al. (2004), Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010) conclude
that “these data indicate that the recognition of the motor behavior
of others can rely on the mere processing of its visual aspects” (ibid.,
p. 270; see also Gallese et al., 2011). Finally, rectangle (c) indicates
that motor simulation during AO does not rely on continuous
concurrent sensory guidance but can also proceed under reduced
visual input, such as transient occlusion.
MOTOR IMAGERY1
Rectangles (d) to (f) represent wholly internally driven motor
simulation. We propose that vivid MI can invoke the full spec-
trum of sensory and motor representation (d), whereas less vivid
instances of MI, remembering, and goal prediction (e, f) might
lack specific sensory features but still originate in motor simu-
lation. In line with this, MI is commonly defined as the mental
simulation of one’s own performance without any associated
overt movement (Jeannerod, 1994). It involves a subset of the
neurocognitive preparatory and “real-time” processes of motor
1Note that in Figure 1, unlike in Shepard’s (1984) original schematic, we
have deliberately conflated the transition from perception (a–c) to imagery
(d–f) with a change of the observer’s viewpoint: for perception, we assume
observation of a third person’s action (the most typical situation in which
mirror neurons have been studied), and for imagery, we assume MI of one’s
own action (first-person perspective). Already Jeannerod (1994) pointed to
an intermediate simulation state, namely dynamic visual imagery of a third
person’s action, which comes closest to visual perception of another person’s
action. For simplicity of exposition we will largely neglect this case of exter-
nal visual imagery in the present paper. However, we will consider perspective
manipulations in AO in section “Perspective matters.”
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execution. More specifically, the preparatory phase of both motor
execution and MI (Vogt, 1994) typically includes the anticipation
of distal and proximal action effects (e.g., Ziessler et al., 2012)
along with, for example, an action-oriented processing of object
properties (Milner and Goodale, 2008). The real-time processes
during both execution and MI further involve a “sense of effort”
(James, 1890), agency (Frith, 2010, 2013), the experienced or
simulated kinesthetic and other sensory input, and related mon-
itoring operations (Shallice, 2004). One main difference between
actual and imagined movement is that during the latter, motor
commands are inhibited throughout the motor system to prevent
overt execution (Guillot et al., 2012a). Practically, inhibition dur-
ing MI may be a functional process resulting from the specific
contribution of neural sites usually dedicated to overt motor pro-
cessing. From a multifactorial viewpoint, motor inhibition might
involve both cerebral and spinal mechanisms, and three possi-
ble routes for motor command inhibition during MI have been
proposed in the literature (Guillot et al., 2012a).
In summary, Figure 1 introduces the notion that AO and MI
can involve a similar range of sensory and motor representational
processes that constitute a continuous descriptive framework,
where the two principal dimensions are the external vs. internal
origin, and the emphasis on sensory resonance vs. motor simula-
tion. AO and MI differ in that AO can involve motor simulation
to varying degrees, and that it can rely on both external and (in
part) internal guidance, whereas MI proceeds by definition in the
absence of external guidance, and it can vary in the concreteness
of sensory representation. These proposals will be elaborated in
the next two sections.
MOTOR IMAGERY AS MOTOR SIMULATION
The ability to imagine is one of the most remarkable capacities
of the mind to simulate sensations, actions and other types of
experience. Morris et al. (2005, p.19) defined imagery as “the
creation or re-creation of an experience generated from memorial
information involving quasi-sensorial, quasi-perceptual and quasi-
affective characteristics, that is under the volitional control of the
imagery, and which may occur in the absence of the real stimulus
antecedents normally associated with the actual experience.”Within
this general definition, the process of imagining motor execution
is known as MI. MI is a multimodal construct based on distinct
sensory modalities, and there is compelling evidence that differ-
ent imagery modalities and imagery types can be performed, with
visual and kinesthetic imagery being probably themost frequently
reported. Diary imagery studies have shown that about two thirds
of our mental images are visual in nature (Moran, 2002). During
internal visual imagery (first-person perspective), people visual-
ize the action as it would happen in real-life and see images as if
through their own eyes. During external visual imagery (third-
person perspective), people imagine, like spectators, the action
that somebody is performing, regardless of the agency of that
movement (i.e., whether they “see” themselves or others perform-
ing it). By contrast, kinesthetic imagery involves the sensations
of how it feels to perform an action, including the force and
effort perceived during movement, hence suggesting the body as
a generator of forces (Jeannerod, 1994). Practically, these defini-
tions suggest that MI is the prototypical form of motor simulation
(Jeannerod, 2001, 2006). While one can consider that pure visual
imagery—i.e., without engaging inmotor simulation—is possible
(e.g., think about consequences of different actions abstractly),
MI requires a motor strategy in almost all situations. In his motor
simulation theory, Jeannerod (2006, p. 130) postulated that rep-
resented actions might involve a large subset of the mechanisms
that usually participate in the various stages of action generation,
including motor execution.
A significant number of experimental and neuroimaging stud-
ies support the proposal that MI involves motor simulation.
First evidence comes from mental chronometry work, where
researchers compared the time taken to imagine a movement
with that needed to actually perform it (for review, see Guillot
et al., 2012b). Since the pioneering contribution on this topic by
Decety et al. (1989), a handful of experimental studies have shown
that participants take the same time to achieve both physical and
mental tasks. This is known as the principle of temporal congru-
ence, which is based on motor prediction of the temporal features
of the movement to be imagined. While there are several influ-
encing factors likely to affect imagery times (Guillot and Collet,
2005), mental chronometry data strongly support that partici-
pants engage in motor simulation of the actual movement during
MI by predicting as accurately as possible the temporal features
of the corresponding action. A second line of evidence derives
from recording the autonomic nervous system activity duringMI.
In their recent review, Collet et al. (2013) conclude that engag-
ing in MI requires motor planning and programming operations,
and anticipating the possible consequences of an action, such
brain operations being accompanied by a set of physiological
responses which can be recorded at the level of peripheral effec-
tors. There is now ample evidence that MI and physical practice
of the same movement elicit similar autonomic nervous system
responses (e.g., Decety et al., 1991; Wuyam et al., 1995; Roure
et al., 1999), and that imagery ability and efficacy can even be
objectified and evaluated through autonomic responses (Collet
et al., 2011).
Neuroimaging experiments also support the contention that
MI involves motor simulation. Understanding the neural corre-
lates of goal-directed action, whether executed or imagined, and
exploring the neural underpinnings of different kinds of MI, has
been an important purpose of cognitive brain research for the
last three decades (for reviews, see Jeannerod, 1994; Grèzes and
Decety, 2001; Nyberg et al., 2006; Munzert et al., 2009; Hétu
et al., 2013). Briefly, studies have demonstrated that MI engages
motor systems, and that the cerebral plasticity resulting from
actual practice also occurred as a result of MI. These findings help
to explain why MI can improve actual performance, and further
contribute to motor memory consolidation. Of specific interest
is the strong overlap between the neural networks mediating MI
and the corresponding substrates activated during physical prac-
tice. Interestingly, Ehrsson et al. (2003) found that MI of hand,
foot and tonguemovements specifically activated the correspond-
ing hand, foot and tongue sections of the primary motor cortex,
hence suggesting specific motor simulation processes during MI.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from studies comparing the
neural networks activated during visual and kinesthetic imagery
(Solodkin et al., 2004; Guillot et al., 2009), as motor systems were
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found to be more active during kinesthetic imagery, which is
closer to actual practice and requires considering the body as a
generator of forces to simulate the movement. Finally, a seminal
clinical study in a patient with bilateral parietal lesions showed
a complete unawareness of movement execution during imagery,
where the patient exhibited hand movements during MI of the
same body segments while explicitly denying that they occurred
(Schwoebel et al., 2002). In other words, this patient engaged
in complete motor simulation but failed to inhibit the motor
consequences of MI which usually preclude actual movement.
A last line of (indirect) evidence of motor simulation dur-
ing MI comes from experimental studies showing practice and
instantaneous priming effects. Many studies of mental prac-
tice effects have demonstrated the efficacy of MI for improving
motor performance and consolidation (for reviews, see Feltz and
Landers, 1983; Driskell et al., 1994; Weinberg, 2008; Schuster
et al., 2011). Such simulation of movements may engage rele-
vant motor-related areas and might further build associations
among processes implemented in different areas, hence facili-
tating subsequent motor execution (Jeannerod, 2001; Kosslyn,
2010). Recently, Ramsey et al. (2010) further demonstrated that
imagining an action that was different to the to-be-performed
action interfered with action execution. This finding shows that
MI is likely to prime the motor system to produce the action,
hence supporting that MI involves motor simulation processes
(see also Vogt, 1995, 1996).
RESEARCH ON ACTION OBSERVATION AND MOTOR
IMAGERY
While the general topic of mental imagery, if not MI itself, is
one of the oldest areas of inquiry in psychology (Galton, 1883;
James, 1890; Sully, 1892; Titchener, 1909), by contrast, “action
observation” as a phrase seems not to have become prominent in
the psychological literature until the 1990s, following a series of
much-cited papers on mirror neurons and their properties (Di
Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996,
see Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2010). Of course, this is not
to say that observation of action was ignored by psychological
research prior to this: it clearly was not. However, AO was given
a new, or renewed, significance by the discovery of mirror neu-
rons and developments in the understanding of perception-action
links. Whereas the computational stages in MI, from the inten-
tion to act to real-time imagery, are most likely highly similar to
those in non-imagined actions, the notion of direct links between
AO and the motor system is less intuitive, and only over the
last two decades, theorizing in neuroscience and psychology has
fully embraced the latter idea. We now briefly recapitulate these
developments, with a view on the commonalities and differences
between AO and MI.
The discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque monkey was
made in the context ofmotor neuroscience (Rizzolatti and Fabbri-
Destro, 2010). The original findings opened up the possibility
of establishing action understanding as a new, cognitive func-
tion of the motor system, and this pursuit has been a strong
driver of the related research from its very beginning (Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010). Furthermore, once the existence of mirror
neurons was established, for experimental scientists in various
disciplines the study of AO and related imitative phenomena
promised to illuminate intuitively appealing psychological top-
ics such as empathy and theory of mind (but see Frith and Frith,
2006, 2012; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). This prompted an
impressive research effort into potentially similar mirror mech-
anisms in the human brain (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010).
Whereas the number of human brain regions with mirror proper-
ties and their exact functions is still under debate (e.g., Rizzolatti,
2005; Gallese et al., 2011), a large number of neuroimaging stud-
ies have demonstrated thatmotor cortical structures in the ventral
and dorsal premotor cortex and in the adjacent caudal sector of
the IFG are typically activated during AO, together with visual
temporal and posterior parietal regions (Caspers et al., 2010), as
well as somatosensory cortex (Keysers et al., 2010). Together these
regions are also known as the “AO network.”
As we have already noted in section “A case for motor imagery
during action observation,” a fairly large overlap of activations
was found in the few studies that have directly compared AO and
MI, possibly indicating that basic motor simulation processes are
shared between MI and AO. Kilner (2011) recently proposed a
two-process account of AO, where the initial action recognition
(via a ventral temporo-frontal pathway) is segregated frommotor
simulation (via the parieto-frontal mirror circuit). This proposal
does not preclude the rapid and simultaneous operation of the
two processes, and it helps to clarify our present focus on the
second process in Kilner’s framework, motor simulation (Pezzulo
et al., 2013). Motor simulation, in the sense of an internal, on-
line representation of the observed action, is particularly useful
when the observer needs to predict a certain temporal landmark
(e.g., object release) of the observed action for purposes such
as attuning one’s own action toward this landmark or synchro-
nizing one’s own action with the observed action. A particularly
impressive demonstration of the close coupling between observed
actions and the observer’s motor system was provided by Borroni
et al. (2005), who showed that the excitability of the motor sys-
tem exhibited a cyclical time course that closely matched that of
an observed rhythmical action. In fact, such motor simulation, or
“motor resonance” (Rizzolatti et al., 2002) is so universally use-
ful that it might be described as a default mode of visuo-motor
processing during AO. Finally, Schubotz (2007) and Bubic et al.
(2010) have generalized this form of action prediction beyond
actions that are in the behavioral repertoire of the observer
and demonstrated that the premotor cortex is also involved in
the prediction of non-biological events and event sequences. In
summary, the available neuroimaging studies clearly support the
notion of motor simulation as a default mode of AO, which can
subserve a variety of functions.
In psychological research, the seminal reaction time studies by
Brass et al. (2000) and Stürmer et al. (2000), both conducted in
W. Prinz’ perception-action group at the Max-Planck Institute
for Psychological Research, motivated a large set of studies on
visuomotor priming or “automatic imitation” (for reviews, see
Vogt and Thomaschke, 2007; Heyes, 2011). Basically, these stud-
ies show that observed actions can bias the speed and accuracy
in which similar actions are performed, and they thus provide
behavioral evidence for direct links between AO and motor
planning. A central feature of these studies is that the observed
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actions are normally irrelevant for the observer’s own action
planning, which strengthens the notion of low-level, automatic
perception-action links. A second feature of this line of research
was its focus on static depictions of actions [e.g., the prototypical
lifted index finger of Brass et al. (2000)], although more recently
automatic imitation effects have also been documented for tem-
porally extended actions, such as everyday rhythmical actions
(Eaves et al., 2012).
As already pointed out in section “Action observation and
motor imagery—a continuum,” a key difference between AO
and MI is their external vs. internal origin. AO involves the
sensory processing and attunement to the partly unpredictable
action “out there,” whereas these processes are by definition not
part of MI. AO thus includes a wider range of neurocognitive
processes than MI, particularly action recognition and intention
understanding (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010), action prediction
(Springer et al., 2013), and collaborative action (either imitative
or complementary, joint action, Bekkering et al., 2009). In the
present paper, we focus on an instance of AO which exhibits
the greatest similarity to MI, namely the repeated observation
of largely predictable action displays, such as the repeated
observation of object grasping as used in motor rehabilitation
(Ertelt et al., 2007; Nedelko et al., 2012). As described above,
a large number of both neuroimaging and behavioral studies
confirm the involvement of motor processes in this form of AO.
Notwithstanding the considerable overlap between AO and MI
in this respect, AO surely encompasses additional neurocognitive
processes.
This brief review of neuroimaging and behavioral research
on AO reinforces the idea that, until now, the two bodies of
research have not been particularly interested in the possible
commonalities between AO and MI. Both neuroscientists and
psychologists were (understandably) attracted by the opportunity
to manipulate visual displays, rather than MI instructions, and
to demonstrate visuomotor priming effects independently of the
observer’s task instructions. Likewise, researchers working on MI
have rarely explored the virtues of using task-irrelevant displays,
given that participants can be directly instructed to engage in MI
tasks. That is, as already noted in the Introduction, until now
the processes of AO and MI have, with a few notable exceptions,
been considered separately and investigated by different groups
of scientists2 (for different sub-communities within research on
MI, see Moran et al., 2012). In the remainder of this section, we
present two quantitative literature analyses which tentatively sup-
port this claim, and then turn to previous points of contact and
attempts of integration between the two research fields.
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE AO / MI LITERATURE
One way to demonstrate a lack of overlap between research on AO
and MI is to revisit the related meta-analyses. Interestingly, the
first such meta-analysis (Grèzes and Decety, 2001) encompassed
2There are substantial critiques of the idea of scientific communities and
of citation analyses as sufficient basis for establishing them (Woolgar, 1976;
Edge, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1982; Zuckerman, 1987). Our aim is not to make
a bold claim for the existence of separate (a problematic term) communities
(another problematic term) but more modestly to highlight how the theories
and findings have not been cross-referenced in a way we see as productive.
motor execution and MI, as well as AO. The more recent meta-
analyses, however, are either focused on AO (Caspers et al., 2010,
on AO and imitation; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Grosbras
et al., 2012, on AO and metalizing) or on MI (Hétu et al., 2012,
2013), but not on both. Despite the wholly legitimate, narrower
focus of these recent meta-analyses, overlap between the under-
lying individual studies would still be conceivable. However, a
comparison between Caspers et al.’s (2010) and Hétu et al.’s
(2013) meta-analyses shows surprisingly little overlap: Of the 87
studies on cortical activations during AO and imitation that were
included in themeta-analysis by Caspers et al. (2010), just four are
also cited in Hétu et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis on the neural cor-
relates of MI. Even allowing for different papers being reviewed
in order to justify a novel contribution, this number is small. And
of the 335 papers cited by the two articles together, just 18 are
cited by both. This offers at least a prima facie case for claiming
that the two research areas have not overlapped to the extent one
might have expected.
Looking more widely at the impressive literature dealing with
these two research areas confirms that MI and AO have been
largely studied in relative isolation from each other. For instance,
over the last 20 years, both MI and AO have been shown to
contribute to improve motor performance and facilitate motor
recovery, but few researchers have investigated whether MI and
AO might be combined or considered in a common framework.
We performed a literature search from the PubMed database by
selecting indexed articles related to (i) motor/movement/action
imagery and (ii) motor/movement/AO and action imitation. A
large sample of 2172 references (including review papers) met the
topical inclusion criteria (note that a substantial number of sport-
related references do not appear in the Pubmed database and were
therefore not considered in this illustrative overview of MI and AO
research areas. This may explain the unexpectedly small number
of MI studies in Sport psychology). 1203 articles investigated MI
while 969 focused on AO. Each reference was then categorized as
a study on either brain computer interface (BCI), cognitive psy-
chology, rehabilitation, or sport psychology (Figure 2). The lack
of AO research in BCI is basically expected and trivial. A larger
number of AO studies than of MI studies was found in cogni-
tive psychology, while the reverse was true in rehabilitation, which
makes sense. The higher number of AO studies in sport psychol-
ogy is more surprising, but the list of references retrieved from
our chosen database is not exhaustive in this specific area.
The most important outcome of this analysis is that only
68 articles (3.1% of the sample) considered both AO and MI
concurrently (including 14 review papers—2 in Cognitive
psychology, 2 in Sport psychology and 10 in Rehabilitation).
The most famous integrated accounts of AO and MI can be
found in seminal theoretical papers (Shepard, 1984; Jeannerod,
1994, 2001, 2006; Annett, 1996). These authors specifically
considered both the prescriptive nature and the neural models
of action representations. Holmes and Calmels (2008, 2011) later
contrasted the definitions and benefits of AO and MI. However,
none of these important contributions was really designed to
consider the possible role of MI during AO, either when AO and
MI are congruent or incongruent. Few neuroimaging studies
have considered both AO and MI, and the neural underpinnings
of AO and MI were largely studied in isolation until more
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recently, when more detailed overviews of the substrates of action
simulation have been provided (Munzert et al., 2009; Lorey
et al., 2013a,b). Only a handful of researchers even considered
concurrent AO+MI (see section “A case for motor imagery
during action observation”). The advent of transcranial magnetic
stimulation and the study of corticospinal excitability increased
the number of studies contrasting and/or combining AO and
MI (Clark et al., 2004; Leonard and Tremblay, 2007; Tremblay
et al., 2008; Conson et al., 2009; Liepert and Neveling, 2009;
Sakamoto et al., 2009; Battaglia et al., 2011; Feurra et al., 2011;
Loporto et al., 2011; Bianco et al., 2012; Tsukazaki et al., 2012).
Furthermore, researchers investigating BCI systems now consider
the impact of both AO and MI on the modulation of brain
rhythms (e.g., Neuper et al., 2009). Finally, some experimental
studies in the field of sport psychology (Lejeune et al., 1994),
cognitive psychology (Vogt, 1996; Conson et al., 2009; Ramsey
et al., 2010; McCormick et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2012), as well
as review studies in the field of motor rehabilitation (Mulder,
2007; Johansson, 2012) have investigated the respective effects of
MI and AO and whether AO primes or improves MI [for a review
on learning effects, see also Gatti et al. (2013)].
Basically, most of the studies mentioned above contrasted
AO and MI, only very few considered concurrent AO+MI, and
until recently, none had considered coordinative or conflicting
AO+MI (see below). Curiously, several researchers opposed AO
and MI in order to find which technique is likely to be optimal
in enhancing performance. For instance, Holmes and Calmels
(2008, 2011) stated that observation can provide some solutions
to the problems identified in the use of imagery (e.g., image gen-
eration and maintenance, behavioral agency, control of visual
perspective, and viewing angle) and offers a more ecologically
valid environment for addressing many sporting tasks. Whilst
this is probably sound in some circumstances and their exam-
ples are well-illustrated, it is unclear whether or not observation
as conceptualized by Holmes and Calmels is accompanied by
the mental representation of the corresponding action sensu MI.
Another example comes from instructions delivered in some MI
experiments where researchers have drawn conclusions about
MI use when the participants were actually asked to engage in
combined AO andMI (Macuga and Frey, 2012). All combinations
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of AO, MI, and AO+MI studies in the four
pre-determined research areas.
of AO+MI procedures will now be detailed in section “Multiple
roles of motor imagery during action observation,” in order
to provide a better overview of the possible associations and
differences between AO and MI.
MULTIPLE ROLES OF MOTOR IMAGERY DURING ACTION
OBSERVATION
In the previous section, we have pointed out that research on
AO and MI has been carried out, to a large extent, by differ-
ent research groups, despite the fact that integrative accounts
of AO and MI as sub-forms of action representation, or action
simulation, have been available for quite some time (Shepard,
1984; Jeannerod, 1994, 2001, 2006). The possibility of concurrent
AO+MI states, however, was not featured in the above accounts.
In section “A case for motor imagery during action observation”
we have already made a case for concurrent AO+MI, based on the
recent neuroimaging studies byMacuga and Frey (2012), Nedelko
et al. (2012), and Berends et al. (2013). We now explore the
full spectrum of AO+MI states (Figure 3), and begin with per-
haps the most practically relevant scenario: the case of congruent
AO+MI, which was also studied by the above authors.
CONGRUENT AO+MI
Here the observer is imagining self-execution whilst observing
another person performing the same type of action. In a first
approximation, the combined rectangles (b) and (d) in Figure 1
correspond to this scenario, where rectangle (b) represents the
simulation of the observed person’s action, and rectangle (d) the
simulation of one’s own action. In line with our definition of MI,
the latter simulation includes a “sense of effort” (James, 1890),
a sense of agency, and the imagined kinesthetic sensations that
would arise during one’s own motor execution.
At first sight, the idea of two simulation processes that run
in parallel might appear unparsimonious, but consideration of
incongruent and conflicting AO+MI states (see below) will
strengthen this “dual-simulation” view. Subjectively, the contrast
between AO and AO+MI is striking: Whereas in typical AO, the
observer can certainly engage with the observed action and, e.g.,
anticipate the next steps in a high jump or in a household routine,
in concurrent AO+MI one’s own body schema gets “switched on”
and, e.g., an observed hand movement is mapped onto one’s own
felt hand (and in body-oriented actions such as brushing teeth,
this simulation could further include imagery of the pressure of
the toothbrush on the teeth). This subjective difference is pre-
sumably reflected in the stronger activations for AO+MI in a
number of cortical sites found in the studies by Macuga and Frey
(2012) and Nedelko et al. (2012). Further careful manipulation
of imagery instructions during AO will be required to pinpoint
the neural signatures of the two concurrent processes. For exam-
ple, we would expect that activations in somatosensory cortex,
which are consistently found during execution and AO (Keysers
et al., 2010) would be substantially enhanced by related AO+MI
instructions. Surprisingly, while this region has been found to be
activated during MI (e.g., Porro et al., 1996; Lotze et al., 1999;
Gerardin et al., 2000), the somatosensory cortex has rarely been
considered a region of interest in MI studies, and, therefore, its
involvement was not extensively discussed.
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FIGURE 3 | The spectrum of concurrent AO+MI states. Top panel:
congruent AO+MI; Center panel: coordinative AO+MI, where two
different actions A and B are co-represented in some form; Bottom panel:
conflicting AO+MI (see text for details).
The above conceptualization of AO+MI poses a number
of important questions. First, it is unclear at present to what
extent participants might carry out standard AO instructions as
AO+MI tasks. That is, to what extent do they spontaneously
imagine themselves performing the observed action, whether
asked to do so or not. For example, in the prominent study
by Calvo-Merino et al. (2005), observers were asked to judge
“how tiring” the observed dancing movements felt,—an instruc-
tion that might well invite concurrent AO+MI. Accordingly, the
frequency of spontaneous concurrent AO+MI is an important
and largely ignored confound in the majority of existing neu-
roimaging studies on AO. The elegant fMRI study by Oosterhof
et al. (2012) underlines this possibility via an in-depth compari-
son of activations for AO during motor execution with those for
AO+MI.
Second, in our overview of different simulation states in sec-
tion “Action observation and motor imagery—a continuum,” we
have left it open as to when the observer might hold a sense
of agency. Generally we would assume agency for all forms of
MI, including AO+MI. However, it is debatable whether the
involvement of motor simulation processes during AO per se
necessarily implies the sense of agency that is so typical of MI.
As pointed out above, Schubotz (2007; see also Bubic et al.,
2010) has argued that predictive operations of the motor sys-
tem are not limited to human actions but include a variety of
inanimate events. To give a recent example, Press et al. (2012)
provided evidence for responses of the ventral premotor cor-
tex, a classical “mirror” area, in coding geometric shapes. Thus,
there are certainly examples of motor cortical involvement with-
out experienced agency. Also for observation of human action, it
is conceivable that motor simulation can occur without a sense of
agency and without a mapping of the observed action onto the
observer’s own body schema. One possibility is that the observer
only holds a sense of agency when he or she co-represents the
observed action as their own action via MI. If this view can be
substantiated, then the notion of “understanding actions from the
inside” (e.g., Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010; Gallese et al., 2011)
would appear to unnecessarily conflate “default mode” motor
simulation processes during AO and the sense of agency that is
experienced during MI and AO+MI. In other words, we suggest
that the former processes do not imply agency, and that agency
typically results from co-representation sensu AO+MI. The sub-
jective experience of AO is not the same as that of AO+MI, and,
despite the activation overlap documented so far, we would pre-
dict agency-related differences in the underlying neurocognitive
processes.
A third interesting question arises regarding the nature of the
interactions and temporal coupling between the observed action
and the two proposed simulation processes. According to the
single cell recording work on mirror neurons (Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010), the temporal coupling between the observed
action and its internal motor representation is tight (see also
Borroni et al., 2005). Indeed, these studies indicate minimal
delays between the external event and its motor representation.
In contrast, at present we have no information about the pos-
sible coupling between the observed action and the MI-related
simulation, or about that between both internal simulation
processes.
Fourth, it is entirely possible that engaging in MI concurrently
with AO draws on resources that are normally used for simulation
of the observed action. For example, performance in predic-
tion tasks might be compromised, or perhaps even enhanced,
by concurrent AO+MI instructions relative to AO instructions.
Competition between these two simulation processes is even
more likely in the following two scenarios.
COORDINATIVE AO+MI
Why should an observer imagine performing action A whilst
observing a different action B? When the two actions have noth-
ing in common, this is likely going to be difficult (see section
“Conflicting AO+MI”). However, one could well argue that, in
overt everyday interactions, performing one action whilst see-
ing another action done is even more common than imitative
behavior. The former is currently studied under the heading of
“joint action” (Bekkering et al., 2009), where one actor responds
to an observed action with a different, self-performed action, nor-
mally in pursuit of a joint or competitive goal (see our example
from combat sports in the Introduction). On closer inspection,
also congruent actions almost always involve a certain degree of
mismatch between observed and imagined action, for example
regarding the plane of motion or perspective, or both. A further,
prime example of joint action is ensemble music, where the very
different actions of, e.g., a jazz singer and bass player are tightly
coordinated in time (see Konvalinka et al., 2010). We would then
argue that the capability to engage in incongruent AO+MI, where
the two actions merit coordination in one way or another, is
grounded in our capacity for joint action.
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Compared to joint action, imagery in AO+MI widens the
scope of possible scenarios considerably. During both congruent
and coordinative AO+MI, observers normally focus their MI on
selected aspects of the observed action. Indeed, the idea that all
degrees of freedom of a complex observed movement could be
mapped in a 1:1 fashion onto the observer’s motor representation
is plain nonsense from the point of view of sensory anatomy alone
(Vogt, 2002). Rather, in the motor simulation of an observed
action, the case of a purely sensorily driven simulation (rectangle
b in Figure 1) is probably quite rare and limited to movements
with very few degrees of freedom, such as isolated finger move-
ments. In the majority of cases, however, AO will be focused
on certain aspects of the observed action. Already in congruent
AO+MI, it is clear that MI allows for a very narrow attentional
focus, for example, on the left knee joint of an observed downhill
skier and on the observer’s corresponding joint. Finally, coor-
dinative AO+MI is even more flexible. Returning to our jazz
ensemble, the bassist might imagine tapping along with the singer
in order to fully capture her intonation and timing. Or in our
example from combat sports, the observer might visually focus
on the opponent’s right arm whilst, in different repeats of the
video, focusing on different own body parts and on their opti-
mal imagined response. In short, coordinative AO+MI is most
likely a common everyday activity, and in formal training set-
tings in sport or motor rehabilitation, it has an abundant range
of applications.
CONFLICTING AO+MI
It is difficult to consider two actions, one observed and one
imagined, that cannot be coordinated in some way but are
solely conflicting. One example might be a skier observing a
movie (showing either himself or someone else) of a slalom but
simultaneously imagine himself falling during the same course,
but this example might also be classified as a variant of coor-
dinative AO+MI. In addition, and besides such (interesting)
examples, it may be difficult to imagine a case of conflicting
AO+MI which can be practically beneficial. However, the co-
representation of conflicting instructions, task sets, or motor
plans is of course a common research topic in psychology and
neuroscience. For instance, most of the available research on
automatic imitation effects (Heyes, 2011) relies on the con-
trast between compatible and incompatible visual stimuli during
action planning as a methodological tool. We would thus like to
illustrate possibilities for studying conflicting AO+MI, together
with the other two AO+MI states, by means of an experimen-
tal paradigm that was recently developed in one of our labs
(Eaves et al., 2012).
The starting point for the study by Eaves et al. (2012) was
the relatively scarce evidence for automatic imitation effects in
movement kinematics, as compared to the ample evidence from
studies using reaction times. In each trial, participants were
shown the picture of a rhythmical target action (e.g., toothbrush-
ing), followed by a movie of an irrelevant distractor action (e.g.,
window wiping), followed by rhythmical execution of the target
action. Across trials, the distractor action was presented in sub-
tly different tempi, which produced a significant imitation bias
during execution. In addition, the imitation bias was significantly
stronger for congruent than for incongruent actions (where con-
gruency could be regarding the type of action and/or the plane of
motion). We interpreted these results in the context of Cisek and
Kalaska’s (2010) biased competition framework, where intended
and observed actions can be represented as competing sensori-
motor streams. For incongruent actions, we proposed that the
competition between the two streams was strongly biased toward
the intended action, and that, consequently, the coupling between
the two streams was relatively weak.
A straightforward means of studying the three AO+MI states
as proposed here would be to manipulate MI instructions during
AO in the above paradigm. In a congruent AO+MI condition,
participants could be asked to imagine performing the instructed
action in synchrony with observing a congruent distractor action.
Based on the results of the neuroimaging studies reviewed in
section “A case for motor imagery during action observation,”
we would predict an enhanced imitation bias for this condi-
tion, relative to pure distractor observation as studied in Eaves
et al. (2012). A coordinative AO+MI condition could be imple-
mented by requiring participants to imagine the instructed action
in synchrony with a distractor action that is incongruent in terms
of action type or plane of motion. Whilst the studies by Hove
et al. (2010) and Eaves et al. (2012) indicate stronger synchro-
nization effects for congruent actions, it is also conceivable that
explicit instructions to coordinate two different actions, as envis-
aged here, might produce a similarly strong imitation bias for
such coordinative AO+MI as for congruent AO+MI. Finally,
conflicting AO+MI conditions could be studied by asking par-
ticipants to imagine holding a static posture of the instructed
action during AO. Here we would expect that the imitation bias
would be largely abolished. A second means of studying conflict-
ing AO+MI would be to display a static image whilst participants
imagine rhythmical performance of the instructed action. Such
manipulations are suitable for exploring the relative strength of
the biasing effects of AO and MI. Overall, we hope that this
example has illustrated that the three AO+MI states, as pro-
posed here, can indeed be subjected to detailed experimental
investigation.
PERSPECTIVE MATTERS
As pointed out in Footnote 1, so far we have focused on third-
person AO and first-person MI. Whilst a full discussion of all
possible scenarios in the related 2× 2matrix would clearly exceed
the scope of the present paper, here we briefly consider possible
manipulations of visual perspective for AO only. In congruent
AO+MI, observers can not only be presented with views of
another person (third-person AO), but also with first-person dis-
plays that show the observer’s limb(s) from a similar viewpoint
as during execution. As described in section “A case for motor
imagery during action observation,” Macuga and Frey (2012)
had manipulated viewpoint during AO+MI but these authors
only obtained negligible differences—possibly due to the rhyth-
mical task used. Interestingly, the recent clinical trial by Cowles
et al. (2013) on AO treatment for stroke patients used a setup
which approximated first-person AO, where the patients observed
a model actor who was sitting next to them. Observation of a
video in first-person perspective, indeed combined with MI, was
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also used as one of the treatment conditions in Ietswaart et al.’s
(2011) study. Certainly, differences in visual perspective should
not be ignored when trying to account for different outcomes
of clinical trials, if only since viewpoint effects have certainly
been found in behavioral studies (e.g., Vogt et al., 2003). A pos-
sible advantage of third-person visual displays during AO+MI
is that the observer can keep the two representations related to
AO and MI more easily distinct than two first-person represen-
tations. On the other hand, the latter might be more likely to
induce a sense of ownership of the observed body parts, as shown
in studies on the rubber hand illusion (Haggard and Tsakiris,
2005) and on mirror-box therapy (Altschuler et al., 1999; Kang
et al., 2011). Surely more experimental studies and related clinical
trials are needed before firm recommendations for presentation
in first- or third person perspective, or perhaps for both, can be
made.
For coordinative AO+MI, it appears unnatural to present
the observed action in first-person perspective, since this would
not match the typical scenario of joint action (see example in
the Introduction). We would thus see first-person visual pre-
sentations in coordinative AO+MI to be of greater interest for
experimental studies than for clinical or training applications.
The same is possibly true for first-person presentations in con-
flicting AO+MI. For example, would the interference effects
between the first-person MI and the conflicting visual displays as
predicted in section “Conflicting AO+MI” be stronger for first-
or third-person presentation of the distractor movies?
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present paper marks the return of one of us (Stefan Vogt)
to issues of MI after almost two decades abstaining from the
topic, which has developed so healthily in the meantime. It is
true that the field of AO per se, which has grown with at least the
same rate over this period, offers ample opportunities to study
perception-action relationships, and that MI is not a manda-
tory step to mediate perception and action (Vogt, 1995, 1996).
Furthermore, it is likely to bemore attractive for an experimental-
ist to manipulate visual displays instead of imagery instructions,
which are always open to subjective interpretation (Holmes and
Calmels, 2008). However, so are visual displays! We hope to have
reminded researchers in the fields of AO and MI that the two
processes do not only share, at least in part, the same neural
substrate (although a meta-analysis of the now available evi-
dence from both areas of research is currently lacking), but more
importantly, that they are easily carried out simultaneously, most
likely not only in the laboratory but also in everyday life. As
we have described in section “Multiple roles of motor imagery
during action observation,” spontaneously performed AO+MI
is an important and largely ignored confound in many related
behavioral and neuroimaging studies. The act of “putting your-
self into another person’s shoes,” or “action understanding from
within” (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010) might often involve pro-
cesses of MI, albeit not necessarily in the sense of a deliberate
conscious effort. With this we do not wish to question the pos-
sible contribution of motor processes to action understanding
and action prediction in general. Rather, we wish to distinguish
the latter from a more specific AO+MI state where the observer
“switches on” his or her own body schema and actively seeks
to align this with the observed action,—a process that is diffi-
cult to capture without reference to the concept of MI. We have
described three subtypes of concurrent AO+MI, namely con-
gruent, coordinative, and conflicting AO+MI, where particularly
the first two bear the potential for a wide range of applications
in sports, occupational training as well as neurorehabilitation.
AO and MI are most likely highly intertwined processes, and
their joint consideration is fruitful in theoretical and applied
contexts alike.
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